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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STA TE OF GEORGIA 
WILLIAM BUTLER and ) 
MANDY BUTLER, individually and on ) 
behalf of all others similarly situated, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
EQUIFAX, INC., ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
CIVIL ACTlON 
FILE NO. 2017CV295644 
Bus. Case Div. 3 
ORDER STAYING CASE 
The above styled matter is before the Court on Defendant Equifax, Inc.' s ("Equifax") 
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Stay ("Motion"). Having considered the Motion and 
argument of counsel, the Court finds as follows: 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs William Butler and Mandy Butler, individually and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated, bring this putative class action seeking to recover damages arising from a data 
breach at Equifax. 
According to Plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint, on September 7, 2017, 
Equifax announced it had suffered a nationwide data breach which Equifax now estimates 
affected over 145.5 million consumers who utilize their credit reporting system. The exposed 
information consists of names, birth dates, Social Security numbers, addresses, driver's license 
numbers, certain credit card numbers, and other personal identifying information. 
Equifax acknowledged it discovered the data breach on July 29, 2017, and thereafter 
initiated an investigation which concluded the unauthorized access occurred from mid-May, 
2017, through July, 2017. It affected not only Equifax customers, but also anyone whose 
information had been gathered by Equifax during credit checks and similar compilations of data. 
Plaintiffs allege the data breach occurred because Equifax failed to implement adequate security 
measures to safeguard consumers' personal information and it ignored known weaknesses in its 
data security, including prior hacks into its information systems. 
It is undisputed that within days of the announcement of the data breach multiple 
individual and putative class actions were filed against Equifax in federal and state courts across 
the country. The federal cases were consolidated into the Multi-District Litigation ("MDL") 
pending in the Northern District of Georgia and currently being presided over by the Honorable 
Thomas Thrash, Jr. 
Several cases were also filed in Fulton County courts. Specifically, on September 13, 
2017, a putative class action was filed against Equifax in the Superior Court of Fulton County by 
Stefan Kircher and William Slaughter' and a separate action was initiated by David Bergeron" 
On September 22, 2017, another putative class action was brought by LaShondra Lee, Amy 
Cooper Smith, Robert Chaplin, Sr., and Robert Chaplin, Jr. in the State Court of Fulton County 
that was ultimately transferred to the Superior Court on December 19, 2017.3 Finally, on 
September 22, 2017, after the Lee case was filed, the Butlers filed the instant action in Fulton 
Superior Court. 
Stefan Kircher and William Slaughter. individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. v. 
Equifax. Inc .. No. 2017CV295 L 74. Superior Court of Fulton County. 
2 David Bergeron. individuallv and on behalf of aJI others similarly situated. No. 20 l 7CV295 I 86. Superior 
Court of Fulton County. 
3 LaShondra Lee. Anw Cooper Smith. Robert Chaplin. Sr.. and Robert Chaplin. Jr .. No. 2018CV300642. 
Superior Court of Fulton County. 
2 
The first three cases were transferred to the Business Case Division by joint motion of the 
parties and have since been consolidated under one Joint Amended Class Action Complaint 
(hereafter, the "Consolidated Action"). Thereafter, this action was transferred to the Business 
Case Division as a related case pursuant to Georgia's Uniform Superior Court Rule 3.2. ("When 
practical, all actions involving substantially the same parties, or substantially the same subject 
matter, or substantially the same factual issues, whether pending simultaneously or not, shall be 
assigned to the same judge"). 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Equifax asks the Court to dismiss this action, asserting dismissal is warranted under 
Georgia's abatement statutes due to the three substantially similar putative class actions 
previously filed in Fulton Courts and now being pursued jointly in the Consolidated Action, 
which arise from the same data breach at issue in the case at bar. Alternatively, Equifax moves to 
stay this action pending resolution of the prior-filed cases. 
A. Abatement/Prior Pending Action Doctrine 
Generally, "when there are two lawsuits involving the same cause of action and the same 
parties that were filed at different times but that both remain pending in Georgia courts, the later 
filed suit must be dismissed." Sadi Holdings, LLC v. Lib. Props., Ltd., 293 Ga. App. 23, 24 
(2008). This principle, often referred to as the prior pending action doctrine, is codified at 
O.C.G.A. §§ 9-2-5(a) and 9-2-44(a). See Doctors Hosp. of Augusta, LLC v. Georgia Dep't of 
Cmty. Health, 344 Ga. App. 583, 583, 81 l S.E.2d 64, 65 (2018). 
O.C.G.A. §9-2-5(a) provides: 
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No plaintiff may prosecute two actions in the courts at the same time for 
the same cause of action and against the same party. If two such actions 
are commenced simultaneously, the defendant may require the plaintiff to 
elect which he will prosecute. 1f two such actions are commenced at 
different times, the pendency of the former shall be a good defense to the 
latter. 
O.C.G.A. §9-2-44(a), in turn, states: 
A former recovery or the pendency of a former action for the same cause 
of action between the same parties in the same or any other court having 
jurisdiction shall be a good cause of abatement. However, if the first 
action is so defective that no recovery can possibly be had, the pendency 
of a former action shall not abate the latter. 
"These Code sections have been construed together to mean that when two civil actions 
involving the same cause of action and the same parties remain pending, but are filed at different 
times, the later-filed action is abated and must be dismissed." Odien v. Varon, 312 Ga. App. 242, 
244, 718 S.E.2d 23, 26 (2011). See Huff v. Valentine, 217 Ga. App. 310, 311, 457 S.E.2d 249, 
250 (1995) ("O.C.G.A. §§ 9-2-5(a) and 9-2-44(a) are closely related in effect and are to be 
considered and applied together") (citing Jones v. Rich's, Inc., 81 Ga. App. 841, 844, 60 S.E.2d 
402, 404 (1950)). 
B. Competing Class Actions 
Although it appears the abatement statutes have never been applied in Georgia in the 
class action context, the Court finds them instructive in addressing the problem presented by 
competing putative class actions. Notably, "[t]he purpose of the doctrine embodied in the[] 
[abatement] statutes 'is to ensure judicial economy, to avoid inconsistent judgments, and to 
prevent harassment of the parties through multiple proceedings."' Doctors Hosp. of Augusta, 
LLC, 344 Ga. App. at 583 (quoting Brock v. C & M Motors, 337 Ga. App. 288, 290 (1), 787 
S.E.2d 259 (2016)); Jenkins v. Crea, 289 Ga. App. 174, 176, 656 S.E.2d 849, 851 (2008). 
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Similarly, class actions help to avoid "(i]nconsistent or varying adjudications", promote 
judicial economy, and may be maintained when the court finds "a class action is superior to other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." O.C.G.A. §9-l l- 
23(b)(l)(A), (3). See Schorr v. Countawide Home Loans, Inc., 287 Ga. 570, 572, 697 S.E.2d 
827, 828 (2010) (quoting Baldassari v. Public Finance Trust, 369 Mass. 33, 337 N.E.2d 701, 
707(5) (1975)) ("The modem class action is 'designed to avoid, rather than encourage, 
unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions'"); Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626, 629 
(11th Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 122 S. Ct. 
2005, 153 L. Ed. 2d 27 (2002) ("A fundamental purpose of the class action is to render 
manageable litigation that involves numerous members of a homogeneous class, who would all 
otherwise have access to the court through individual lawsuits"). See also 7 A Fed. Prac. & Proc. 
Civ. § 1751 (3d ed.), History and Purpose of the Class Action. Cf Parker v. Stone, 333 Ga. App. 
638,641, 773 S.E.2d 793, 796 (2015) ('"The doctrine of priority jurisdiction provides that where 
different tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction over a matter, the first court to exercise 
jurisdiction will retain it' ... [T]he policy behind the doctrine of priority jurisdiction is to reduce 
litigation, by avoiding duplicative suits, and to avoid inconsistent, competing rulings on an 
issue") (citing Stanfield v. Alizot~ 294 Ga. 813,815, 756 S.E.2d 526 (2014); In re J.C.W., 315 
Ga. App. 566, 572, 727 S.E.2d 127, l3 l (20 I 2)). 
Given these similar policy rationales, it is not surprising several states have drawn from 
abatement principles, jurisdictional doctrines, and principles of comity to manage situations 
where multiple putative class actions are filed arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. 
The majority of those courts apply a "first to file" rule, allowing the first filed action to proceed, 
while staying or dismissing without prejudice the latter action pending class certification. See 
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e.g., Ex parte AmSouth Bank, 735 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (Ala. 1999) (holding that a latter filed state 
court class action should be placed on administrative hold until the federal court presiding over a 
prior filed class action determines issue of class certification, finding if the federal court certifies 
a class that includes state plaintiffs' claims, the state action must be abated, but otherwise the 
stay may be lifted and it can proceed as a class action or an individual action); Ex parte Speedee 
Cash of Alabama, Inc., 806 So. 2d 389, 394 (Ala. 2001) (staying a latter filed class action 
pending determination of class certification in a prior filed class action involving substantially 
the same claims); Div. Six State ex rel. James J. Lindsay, Gretchen Chaney, Debra A. Carmody, 
Kenneth P. Merritt v. Honorable John C. Brackma11 Circuit Judge, Circuit Court of Franklin 
Cty., Missouri, No. 68651, 1996 WL 2043, at *2-3 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 1996) (where two 
competing, substantially related class actions were filed in different state circuits, finding the 
trial court should have granted a motion to abate the latter filed action because the court in the 
first action was vested with exclusive jurisdiction of the subject matter at issue in the two cases 
and such would serve the principal function behind class actions, preventing multiplicity of 
suits); Jones v. Educ. Testing Serv .. No. MER-L-1977-04, 2005 WL 975337, at *3, *8 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 7, 2005) (where multiple, related putative class actions were filed in 
different state and federal courts, dismissing without prejudice the latter filed action citing 
principles of comity, judicial economy, and avoiding multiplicity of suits); Derdiger v. TaUman, 
773 A.2d 1005. 1013, 1018 (Del. Ch. 2000) (staying a latter filed putative class action in favor of 
an earlier-file class action "[t]o preserve the resources of the courts and the parties, avoid 
duplication of efforts, and also to avoid ... a palpable risk of inconsistent findings and results") 
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C. A Stay of this Action is Warranted 
Applying the foregoing principles and the prior pending action doctrine to the case at bar, 
the Court finds the requirements of our abatement statutes are substantially satisfied. When 
applying O.C.G.A. §§ 9-2-5(a) and 9-2-44(a) to determine whether or not the cases at issue 
involve the same cause of action, Georgia courts consider whether or not the claims are born out 
of the same transaction or occurrence. Odion v. Varon, 312 Ga. App. 242, 244 (2011). 
Importantly, "minor differences" between two complaints"( will] not controvert the fact that they 
both involve the exact same subject matter." Sadi Holdings, 293 Ga. App. at 25. Indeed, our 
courts have cautioned against construing the abatement statutes too narrowly: 
The requirement that the two cases be of "the same cause of action" is 
founded on the doctrine that "no one should be twice harassed, if it appear 
to the Court that it is for one and the same cause." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Rogers v. Hoskins, 15 Ga. 270, 273 (1854]. To that end, a too technical 
reading of the provision regarding "the same cause of action, between the 
same parties" would be ill-conceived. (See, Rogers, supra, p. 273.) The 
plea in abatement has been held good even where the causes of action are, 
technically speaking, legally disparate and rest in opposite parties, if they 
arise out of the same transaction and if the second suit would resolve the 
same issues as the first pending suit and would therefore be "unnecessary, 
and consequently oppressive. See Hood v. Cooledge. 39 Ga. App. 476, 
479, 147 S.E. 426; Rogers, supra, p. 274. 
Schoen v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Atlanta 154 Ga. App. 68, 69- 70, 267 S.E.2d 466, 
468 (1980). 
First, here, it is undisputed the cases joined in the Consolidated Action were filed prior to 
this action. Although the Butlers assert their case is more advanced than the Consolidated 
Action, the Court is not persuaded as both actions remain in the preliminary stages of litigation. 
Further, the Court finds this action and the prior filed cases which were joined in the 
Consolidated Action all arise from the same transaction or occurrence, the 2017 Equifax data 
breach. Although the Butlers assert there are substantial differences between the claims asserted 
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in these cases, the Court discerns no such material differences. Rather, as evidenced by the chart 
below, all of the claims asserted in the Butler's First Amended Class Action Complaint are also 
being pursued in the Consolidated Action and the putative classes sought to be certified in the 
two cases are substantially the same such that the cases involve the same cause of action. 
O.C.G.A. §9-2-S(a); Schoen, 154 Ga. App. at 69; Odien v. Varon, 312 Ga. App. At 243. 
Case Name Class Action Claims Asserted Proposed Class 
Williams Butler and (I) Violation of Ga. Personal Identity Protection "All citizens of the State of 
Mandy Butler v. Act (O.C.G.A. §10-1-912); Georgia whose Personal 
Equifax, Inc. (Case (2) Negligence (O.C.G.A. §§ 51-l-2, 51-1-4): Information was acquired. or is in 
No. 2017CV295644) (3) Negligence per se for violation of Ga. Personal danger of being acquired. by 
[dcntity Protection Act (O.C.G.A. § I 0-1-912): unauthorized persons in the data 
(4) Violation of Ga. Uniform Deceptive Trade breach announced by Equifax in 
Practices Act (O.C.G.A. §10-1-370): and September 2017 wherein 
(5) Attorney fees and expenses. Equifaxs own Records reflect 
that such Personal Information 
may have been impacted by said 
Data Breach." (First Amended 
Class Action Complaint, 150) 
In re: Equifax Data (I) Negligence: "All persons who arc citizens of 
Security Breach (2) Negligence per sc for violation of Ga. Personal the State of Georgia and whose 
Litigation (Case No. Identity Protection Act (O.C.G.A. § J 0-1-912): personally identifiable 
2017CV295174) (3) Breach of fiduciary duty: information (PII) was acquired, or 
(4) Invasion of privacy-intrusion upon seclusion: is in danger of being acquired, by 
(5) Breach of contract: unauthorized persons in or as a 
(6) Breach of implied contract: result of the data breach 
(7) Unjust enrichment: announced by Equifax in 
(8) Computer theft/invasion of privacy (O.C.G.A. September 2017:' (Joint 
§ 16-9-93): Amended Class Action 
(9) Violation of Ga. Uniform Deceptive Trade Complaint, 185) 
Practices Act (O.C.G.A. §I0-1-370): 
( 10) Declaratory judgment: 
(I I) Punitive damages; and 
(l 2) Attorney fees and expenses (O.C.G.A. 
§13-6-11). 
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However, given the current procedural posture of these cases and the procedural issues 
unique to class actions, the question of whether the same plaintiffs are present in both cases 
presents a more challenging question as different plaintiffs essentially seek to represent the same 
proposed class through competing putative class actions." The Butlers urge, as the named cJass 
representatives in this case, they do not hold the same status in the Consolidated Action where 
they would only be putative class members. See Bedingfield v. Bedingfield, 248 Ga. 91, 92, 281 
S.E.2d 554, 555 (1981) ("In order for [abatement] to be applicable, however, the parties must 
occupy the same status in both suits") (citing Tinsley v. Beeler, 134 Ga. App. 514(1), 215 S.E.2d 
280 (1975)). 
However, this presumes the Butlers will be approved to serve as class representatives in 
this action. There is no inherent right to represent a class. Rather, a plaintiff bringing a putative 
class action has the burden of establishing the right to class certification. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Crutchfield, 256 Ga. App. 582, 582, 568 S.E.2d 767, 768 (2002) (citing Jones v. Douglas 
County, 262 Ga. 317, 324, 418 S.E.2d 19 (1992)). This includes the burden of showing the 
representative parties "will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." O.C.G.A. §9- 
ll-23(a)(4). "[C]olloquially referred to as the adequacy requirement," this is a prerequisite to 
class certification and is a question generally considered in the broader context of class 
certification taking into account "the ability of the plaintiff(s) to represent the class", "the 
forthrightness and vigor with which [they] can be expected to assert and defend the interests of 
the [class] members", and "whether [the] plaintiffs' interests are antagonistic to those of the 
class", among other considerations. Lewis v. Knology, Inc., 341 Ga. App. 86, 90, 799 S.E.2d 
247, 250 (2017), reconsideration denied (Mar. 29, 2017), cert. denied (Sept. 13, 2017) . 
. , 
Equifax. Inc. is the named Defendant in both actions. 
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Consequently, the Butlers are currently parties with individual claims against Equifax 
who seek to be representatives of a putative class and who are members of a class proposed in a 
prior filed putative class action. See Bishop's Prop. & Investments, LLC v. Protective Life Ins. 
Co., 463 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1377 (M.D. Ga. 2006) ("[U]ntil a class is certified it is the plaintiff's 
individual claim that provides the controversy"). The Butlers' ultimate status as litigants 
pursuing claims against Equifax, whether individually or on behalf of a class, remains to be 
determined. Ultimately abatement of the Butlers' putative class action claims may be warranted 
if a class is eventually certified in a prior filed action that incorporates the Butlers' claims. 
However, given the above and because the question of whether or not a class will be 
certified in the federal MDL or in the prior filed Consolidated Action remains pending, the Court 
finds dismissal would be premature and may undermine tbe Butlers' ability to later pursue class 
claims if no class is certified in those prior filed actions. 5 Thus, a stay of this case is warranted. 
A stay in proceedings is merely a suspension of further proceedings, as 
distinguished from an abatement on the one hand or a continuance on the 
other. [T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent 
in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with 
economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How 
this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh 
competing interests and maintain an even balance.' Landis v. North 
American Company, 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 166, 81 L.Ed. 153 
[1936]. 
Bloomfield v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 230 Ga. 484, 484, 198 S.E.2d 144, 145 (1973) (staying 
state court proceedings pending determination of prior filed federal action arising out of same 
transaction and occurrence, finding stay effectuated policy of both state and federal courts to 
avoid multiplicity of suits). 
5 See generally China Agritech. Inc. v. Resl1. 138 S. Cl. 1800 (2018). __ L. Ed. __ (2018) (holding that 
upon denial of class certification. a putative class member. in lieu of promptly joining an existing suit or promptly 
Ii ling an individual action, may not commence a class action anew beyond the Lime allowed by the applicable statute 
of limitations). 
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Here, in light of the relatedness between the Butlers' claims and those asserted in the 
Consolidated Action, and because they stem from the same operative facts, purport to serve the 
interests of the same class, will involve the same questions of law, and involve the same 
discovery, the Court finds a stay of this action pending resolution of the class certification issue 
in the federal MDL or Consolidated Action will best serve principles of judicial economy and 
justice, conserve the resources of the parties, and avoid multiplicity of suits. A stay will not 
prejudice any legal rights as suggested by the Butlers, but rather preserves the Butlers' right to 
timely attempt to pursue the class claims if a class is not certified in the prior filed actions, or to 
pursue their individual claims if they so choose. 
CONCLUSION 
Given all of the above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss this action is DENIED, however, 
the alternative motion to stay is GRANTED. Accordingly, this case is hereby STAYED pending 
further order of this Court. If a class is ultimately not certified in the federal MDL or in the 
Consolidated Action, the Butlers may file an appropriate motion seeking to lift the stay. 
SO ORDERED, this 26th day of July, 2018. '\~ 
~ i L. . ...J~A 
MEiSK WESTMORELAND, JUDGE 
Metro Atlanta Business Case Division 
Fulton County Superior Court 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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Henry A. Turner David Balser, Esq. 
TURNER LAW OFFICES, LLC KING & SPALDTNG LLP 
403 W. Ponce de Leon A venue, Suite 207 1 180 PEACHTREE STREET NE 
Decatur, Georgia 30030 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 
Dana M. Campbell 
FERGUSON BRASWELL FRASER 
KUBASTA, P.C. 
2500 Dallas Parkway, Suite 600 
Plano, Texas 75093 
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